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This is an exciting, important and timely work; it will sell 
well. Anderson has ferreted out and marshaled dozens of sources 
on the 18-year cycle of boom and bust in real estate, its 
history, its mechanics, and its dynamics. Some sources are old 
and neglected; some are current and neglected; but after 
Anderson it will be hard for macro-economists to continue 
neglecting them. He melds the dramatic skills of a raconteur 
with the industry of a scholar and the discipline of a field 
marshal, to keep readers wide awake while they follow and most 
likely accept Anderson’s take on economic history. 
 
One test of an hypothesis is prediction. Anderson accepts that 
challenge, even providing us with a “clock” to let us know where 
we are in the cycle. His theme is “Understanding the Past to 
Predict the Future”. After guiding us through many 18-year 
cycles, from 1800 to date, he sums up with a chapter disarmingly 
titled, “Knowledge we Gained along the Way”. Here are some major 
findings. 
 
1. The prices of land peak before other measures do, i.e. it 
is a leading indicator. Construction peaks after land 
prices do, but before recession hits, where “recession” is 
measured in GDP and other familiar metrics used by the 
NBER. 
2.  Few people study history, so few under about 42 even know 
there is a land cycle. All they know is their own recent 
experience, so in the heat of a land boom, lasting several 
years, they easily fall prey to projecting the boom 
indefinitely forwards. Few leading “mainstream” experts 
forecast crashes, even as they are beginning to happen; 
quite a few deny them even as they turn catastrophic. 
Anderson names names, including Ben Bernanke’s, and most of 
us could add more. 
3. Bank credit swells and shrinks in synch with the land 
cycle. The two interact in a positive feedback process: 
swelling bank credit raises land prices; buyers need more 
credit to purchase the land; the appreciated land then 
serves as collateral for more bank loans, and so on.  
4. Banks are highly vulnerable to downturns because they 
borrow short to lend long. In the heat of a land boom they 
carry inadequate capital reserves to cover the 18-year 
crash, even though that is, to Anderson, predictable. 2 
 
Insuring deposits, and bailing out failed banks, creates 
moral hazard that leads to repeated excesses. 
5. Economists recently have programmed their computers not to 
predict a downturn of more than 25% of the standard 
deviation (a “black swan” moment). This is only the modern 
manifestation of a group delusion that has marked every 
boom in history, a cautious tuning-out of extremes. (This 
propensity is also manifested in their choice of 
statistical measures: medians instead of means; standard 
deviations instead of mean deviations, for example.) 
6.  Several credit crunches and minor disasters occur before a 
major tsunami hits. It takes a real estate cycle to 
generate the proverbial “9
th wave”. There is usually at 
least one mid-cycle slowdown from which we recover nicely. 
Most economists are conditioned to blank out land prices 
from their analyses, so their histories fail to distinguish 
major from minor cycles. Accordingly, they (e.g. the NBER) 
jumble them together indiscriminately, and so miss the 18-
year cycle of land prices. Anderson finds, on the contrary, 
that “land value is the key to forecasting”. 
7. Anderson gives us dates. There were land-price troughs 
starting in 1955, 1973, 1991, followed by slow recovery 
with a “hockey-stick” boom at the end. Accordingly the next 
trough is due in 2009. Going back to 1800 he gives us 
peaks: 1819, 1836, 1857, 1873, 1893. The peak of 1911 is 
curiously muted, and 1926 came a little ahead of schedule, 
even though one could pick 1929. World War II 
understandably upset the schedule, which picks up again, 
however, after the Korean War, from a trough in 1955. 
8. The system of government-granted licenses (privatization) 
is spreading. Privatization is the precondition for trading 
in and monetizing land titles, which creates the land 
cycle. He mentions The World Bank making its loans 
conditional on privatization, and no-bid military 
contracts, but might have added items closer to home: 
fishery licenses, pollution permits, spectrum assignments, 
aircraft slots, water-pumping permits, mining and drilling 
leases, preferential zoning, subsidies to water licensees, 
and a host of evolving forms of private privileges. 
9. Some reliable indicators of a forthcoming peak are: A, 
unusually high land prices and price/rent ratios; B, a rash 
of extra-tall buildings; C, a boom in copper prices; and D, 
an inverted yield curve. 
 
The NBER cycle-dating committee, led by Robert Hall of the 
Hoover Institution, did not announce the downturn of December 
2007 until 11 months after the fact! That was said to make it 3 
 
“official”. Actually, the NBER is private. Calling it “official” 
displays an authoritarian cast of mind within the economics 
profession. Choosing a Hoover Fellow to make the “official” 
calls betrays an unhealthy dependence on far-right think tanks, 
whose forecasting record is dismal.  
 
And yet, the “Secret life” of real estate is not really so 
secret. Anderson has found it from secondary sources, which he 
simply marshals. What’s secret is why this open secret is closed 
to our most prominent macro-economists. One reason is they 
choose to ignore economic history, as shown by their rooting it 
out of their required curricula, replacing it with courses in 
abstruse theory and econometric techniques that mark modern 
“mainstream” writers and journals. "...the institutions that 
teach American elites to think about the modern world are 
unconcerned with teaching them to look at it" (Ada Louise 
Huxtable). 
 
Another reason is that they disdain the study of land values and 
other privileges, lowball their values, and avoid integrating 
them into their models and hypotheses. This is partly from an 
overreaction to the historical Henry George, who put land values 
at the core of his analyses, and bitterly condemned academicians 
for not following his lead. Being both an intellect and a 
political force he stirred up throngs of disciples, some of them 
unlearned and crass, to make of this feud a tradition. That 
seems too petty, however, to explain such systematic dismissal 
of the obvious role of land. The greater and enduring reason is 
probably the defensiveness of rentiers against any challenge to 
their rents and unearned increments. This has led them to found 
and fund leading universities, and more recently think-tanks, 
and to pack the boards of public universities with regents 
supportive of their views. “Governors of universities fall into 
their natural place behind the golden calf, bearing shovels” 
(Tom Beer). Critics label this as “deep lobbying”, and it now 
dominates the intellectual and media worlds. 
 
Another reason is the overemphasis on manipulating data as 
opposed to gathering and evaluating raw data itself. “Give us 
data to chew, and we will chew” is the prevailing attitude, even 
when the data is garbage and the output night soil. There is 
little work on the quality or relevance of the data, and that 
little comes from the fringes of the profession without 
penetrating the core, as engraved in the stone of dozens of new 
and ongoing textbooks. Few heed Jonas Salk’s saying, "I get into 
a dialogue with nature and put the question to nature, not to my 
colleagues, because that's whence the answer must come."   4 
 
On the negative side, “The Secret Life” falls short of being the 
classic it might be because of Anderson’s haste. This is 
understandable, considering the timeliness of his thesis, but he 
leaves many loose ends to trouble a critical reader. Worse, they 
provide fuel for captious critics, who are sure to materialize 
with arson in mind. 
 
Anderson is an investment counselor and popular speaker, like 
one of his favorite sources, Roy Wenzlick. Anderson has stitched 
together many newsletters written over many years, aimed at 
clients looking for investment counsel, leaving two things 
unclear. For one, it is not evident whether he is addressing 
public policy or advising speculators when to buy or sell. His 
major social value judgment, which appears often, is so drastic, 
and so vaguely specified, it does not amount to a specific 
workable idea. He blames private land tenure, which he calls 
“enclosure”, for the boom/bust cycle.  One assumes his 
investment clients filter that out, while appreciating his 
prescient forecasting. Those seeking a guide to public policy, 
however, will wish he had attended more to it. He does draw 
heavily on Georgist sources, especially Fred Harrison, George 
Miller, and Fred Foldvary, so one could infer that he favors the 
Georgist policy of taxing land heavily, with the corollary of 
reassessing it often, to abort incipient booms of irrational 
exuberance. Or he might favor leasing, which he mentions once, 
except there he leaves us hanging with “but that’s another 
story”.  
 
Secondly, it is often unclear to what year his present tenses 
refer. The originals, he writes, came from client newsletters he 
sent out 1998-2004. Some of them read that way. However the book 
is copyrighted 2008, with some additions up to about 2007, again 
using present tenses. Worse yet, he “signed off” on the book 
Sept. 7, 2008. This is curious since the book says nothing about 
the great crash of 2008, except to claim it as a forecast made 
earlier. This is probably the result of haste, but seems a 
little unfair.  
 
He uses too many long quotations. For example, Chapter 2 on the 
peak of 1818 is built around 9 such long quotes from Murray 
Rothbard, along with several from other authors. A reader 
wonders if he is not reading Rothbard’s work with filler by 
Anderson. At the same time, Anderson shows no signs of being a 
doctrinaire Rothbardian: he quotes J.K. Galbraith as often as he 
does Rothbard, and draws on an eclectic range of historians 
including R.C.O. Matthews, Alfred Chandler, Aaron Sakolski, Roy 
Robbins, H.D. Simpson, Paul Johnson, Clarence Long, Reginald 5 
 
McGrane, Harriet Martineau, John Steele Gordon, Charles 
Kindleberger, A.H. Cole, and many others. He has read widely, 
without an ideological filter. 
 
The coverage is extensive, but the scholarship leaves something 
to be desired. Some older sources he omitted are Carter 
Goodrich, Homer Vanderblue, Lewis Maverick, Ernest Fisher, Harry 
Scherman, Philip Cornick,  Alexander Field, and others. On the 
other hand, to his credit, he has exhumed the neglected research 
of Roy Wenzlick. Scholars have undervalued Wenzlick because he 
was, like Anderson, something of a showman and promoter of his 
consulting business. Like Anderson, he took his material on 
lecture tours with dramatic display tools, and catered to the 
self-interest of clients. Yet he, too, discovered the 18-year 
cycle, and left a trove of research materials, which Anderson 
has studied, at the University of Missouri, St. Louis. 
 
The more serious omission is the current work of Robert Shiller, 
Karl Case, Nouriel Roubini, Bryan Kavanagh, Michael Hudson, Piet 
Eichholtz, Anne Goldgar, Eitrheim and Erlandsen, and others, not 
to mention the foolhardy optimism of Bernanke, Lereah, Mandel, 
Greenspan, and other false prophets. It seems that Anderson’s 
extensive reading stopped around 2006. Thus he cites Foldvary’s 
1997 work, but omits his timely 2007 forecast, The Depression of 
2008. 
 
On the nitpicking side, Anderson cites several long quotes only 
to virtual sources, without naming the authors. I searched for 
one on banking at www.college.hmco.com/history, and found only 
ads for what look like high school texts, with nothing on 
banking, and no clue as to whom he is citing. This and other 
signs of impatience with sourcing need correcting in a sequel or 
second edition. 
 
He does a good job of hitting the high spots of major land 
cycles after 1800, along with many vignettes to keep the work 
readable and entertaining. As much as he may digress, however, 
he keeps his eyes on the main chance. He marshals all his 
material to illustrate and confirm his basic thesis about the 
key role of land pricing in the 18-year cycle. His randomness 
optimally tempers his single-mindedness. 
 
At one point he calls 1818 the “first” U.S. economic downturn 
(p.57). Worse than the dating error is the bizarre reason 
Anderson advances for it, an alleged Federal land monopoly that 
converted what had been a commons into taboo territory. That is 6 
 
simply bad history, so bad that Anderson himself later ignores 
it. Elsewhere he makes out 1792 to have been a major crash.  
 
We can overlook the contradiction as a product of haste. More 
seriously, though, he omits the major crash of 1798. This is 
odd, in a work based on the thesis of an 18-year cycle. 1798 is 
tolerably close to 1818 less 18, but 1792 is not. The crash of 
1792 was real enough, but was simply the mid-cycle downturn that 
Anderson has noted in other 18-year cycles. England’s banks 
survived, and her internal improvements moved ahead. The 
American crash was abated by application of the cotton gin and 
expansion of the slave economy of the south. These events in 
America broke the last bottleneck to applying Arkwright’s  
inventions of 1769-70 to allow the explosive growth of England’s 
cotton industry in Lancashire, archetype of the industrial 
revolution. Slater’s Mill of 1793 in Rhode Island helped bring 
the industrial revolution to the new world. 
 
As to 1798, though, it was 1797 when the B of E suspended cash 
payments; when Pitt imposed the first income tax to raise funds 
to fight Napoleon; when English capital was diverted on a grand 
scale from America to subsidizing Napoleon’s enemies; when 
Robert Morris, financier of the American Revolution, lost 
200,000 acres and went to debtor’s prison; when Andrew Jackson 
lost his lands and conceived his hatred of banks; ... this was a 
major crash, and the likely reason John Adams’ lasted only one 
term, Hamilton lost favor, and Jefferson became President. 
 
It would be an error to think that economic history began in 
1800 or 1798. There were capitalism, land tenure, banking, and 
boom/bust cycles – all the elements that Anderson analyzes so 
well from 1800 to date, that one can trace back for centuries: 
the Mississippi Bubble of 1720; the Tulip Bubble of the 1630’s, 
which Eichholtz and Shiller showed to have been a land bubble; 
the end of the Great Migration to New England after 1630; the 
Florentine and Medici banking collapse of 1494; and so on. M.E. 
Levasseur has traced such cycles back to the year 1200.  
 
Whatever its minor faults, Anderson’s Secret History is a book 
to study, remember, and steer by. It reminds me of a German 
barber I once patronized. However I squirmed to defer the next 
trim he would repeat compulsively, vierzehn Tagen, vierzehn 
Tagen!  Anderson’s readers will learn to repeat, achtzehn 
Jahren, achtzehn Jahren!  Whoever wins the Presidential election 
of 2024, Be Prepared! This future President would also be well 
advised to select economists who, like Hudson, Harrison, 
Foldvary, Kavanagh, Shiller, Roubini, and Anderson, foresaw the 7 
 
Great Crash of 2008, rather than insiders like Romer and 
Bernanke who foresaw only a “Great Moderation” because we had, 
so they said, “conquered the business cycle”. 
 
 
 